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CONTROLLING ALLIANCES THROUGH EXECUTING PRESSURE
L. A. KHODARINOVA1, J. M. BINNER2∗, L. R. FLETCHER3, V. N. KOLOKOLTSOV4, AND P. WHYSALL5
Abstract. In this paper the standard prisoners’ dilemma is embedded in environmental conditions in which
the interaction takes place. This provides a theoretical background to the analysis of the empirical studies
which indicate that including additional factors when considering an alliance is very important. We show that
such an approach, though theoretically simple, provides a powerful tool for suggesting successful strategies for
forming, maintaining and withstanding a rival attack on an alliance, projecting an alliance possible success and
determining which measures must be taken to maintain an alliance in a changing environment. It also provides
insight into the possibility of preventing alliances in rivals. The relative simplicity of this framework means that
the approach can be easily applied when the real life decisions are taken.
1. Introduction
Recently there has been an increasing interest in understanding the instruments responsible for success in
business alliances. In a highly competitive and globalized market alliances and joint ventures are becoming
increasingly popular by allowing companies to share risks, develop new markets, acquire technological advances
and so on. There has also been a significant increase in alliances between competitors1,2 as such ventures not
only improve their market performance but also reduce costs due to eliminating rivalry hazards. Unfortunately,
empirical research2−8 shows that business alliances have high failure rates (at or higher than 50%). The reason
for such failure has a dual nature2,9. On one side non opportunistic reasons such as managerial complexity and
coordinating costs play a significant role. The other important reason is interfirm rivalry as each partner is
acting to maximize its own benefits. This paper is aimed at addressing the second reason.
In order to explain the cooperative behaviour when the risk of opportunistic behavior is high game-theoretic
descriptions of social interactions are often used10,11,12. The single-interaction prisoners’ dilemma has been
widely used11,12 as a generic model of such interactions. Analysis of the single interaction prisoners’ dilemma
leads to the conclusion that cooperative behaviour cannot be rational; nevertheless it is observed by many
empirical studies. The main approach to resolving this paradox has been based on considering the iterated
prisoners’ dilemma, i.e. considering the game in the long term context9,10,11. This changes the structure of the
game and cooperation becomes rational13,14. The basic idea is that by including future interactions “punishing
strategies” may be used, i.e., “if you do not cooperate now, you will be punished in the future”. Unfortunately,
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2the empirical studies indicate10 that companies using such strategies are not very successful in maintaining
alliances. Nor are such strategies evolutionary stable and if a player operates in a noncooperative society no
alliance can evolve in the long run15.
From a game-theoretic point of view there exist many different approaches to overcoming these difficulties16−24.
Such approaches, most of which are based on computer simulations17−23, in particular include considering com-
plex strategies in an evolutionary model17,18. For example players may be allowed to learn from experience19.
It is shown19 that mutual cooperation can be maintained when players have a primitive learning ability. It
was shown that under proposed learning evolution some cooperative strategies can invade not only uncondi-
tional cooperation, Tit for Tat and Pavlov strategies but also noncooperative strategies. Another approach is
to embed the prisoners’ dilemma into a spatial context20,21. For example20, the version of the iterated prison-
ers’ dilemma with only unconditionally cooperating and unconditionally defecting players interacting with the
immediate neighbours was considered. It was shown20 that such a model can generate chaotically changing
spatial patterns, in which cooperators and defectors both persist indefinitely. The pattern generated by groups
of cooperators exhibits21 the scale-invariance which is typical of self-organized criticality22. Multi players games
are also considered23 with solutions found by computer simulations. There is also a direction of research based
on the idea of private information available to the players. That is, each player may have some information
about themselves or state of the game which is not available to other players. The recent developments24 in this
area have revealed the possibility of cooperation under condition of private information. Providing an impor-
tant framework for understanding evolution of cooperation in Nature, such approaches however are not easily
applicable to the situations when the real life business alliances must be managed. Let us notice nevertheless
that all of these studies indicate that cooperative behaviour becomes understandable when the interaction is
considered in a wider context (such as length of interaction, for example).
Surprisingly, there are few theoretical studies that suggest modeling cooperation by the games other than
prisoners’ dilemma. Empirical research on the other side shows that including additional factors when con-
sidering an alliance is very important and may suggest successful strategies for forming and maintaining an
alliance. For example1, it is shown that engaging in unilateral commitments significantly increases an alliance
success rate. It is argued1 that unilateral commitments change the payoff structure of the game in such a way
that mutual defection is no longer the Nash Equilibrium in the single interaction game. Unfortunately the lack
of general game theoretic description of such and similar situations leaves it unexplained why some unilateral
commitments lead to an alliance in one situation but not in others.
In this paper we try to overcome this deficiency by embedding the standard Prisoners Dilemma in environ-
mental conditions in which the interaction takes place. We show that such an approach, thought theoretically
simple, provides a powerful tool for suggesting successful strategies for forming, maintaining and withstanding
a rival attack on an alliance, projecting an alliance’s possible success and determining which measures must
be taken to maintain an alliance in a changing environment. It also provides insights into the possibility of
preventing alliances in rivals. The relative simplicity of this framework means that the approach can be easily
applied when the real life decisions are taken.
3The main idea of our approach is to evaluate the external conditions under which the alliance is forming. We
suggest that the majority of such conditions can be evaluated as either unchangeable or changeable pressure
(benefits) to the players. As far as the unchangeable factors are concerned they can be considered as the base
payoffs of the single interaction game (for example prisoners’ dilemma in our case). We model changeable
conditions by introducing a “third player”. The “third player” can be irrational25 and, for example, can
represent “Nature”, that is environmental or other conditions that have an impact on the game but do not
depend on the behaviour of the first two players (for example, a highly competitive market or a tax regime
imposed by a government). This could also include pressure that a company decides to impose on itself by
engaging in unilateral commitments. The “third player” can also be rational. In this context there might be
a real third player who interacts with the first and the second players (engaged in a prisoners’ dilemma type
game for example), possibly to a degree he can choose.
This model correlates well with the empirical studies showing that by considering the two players not in
isolation but in the context of their interaction with the “third player” a cooperative Nash Equilibrium between
the first two players may emerge. We investigate the effect which the existence of the “third player” has on the
possibility of cooperation. This provides mechanisms for controlling and managing the alliances via changing
the external conditions. Considering the “third player” as another company attacking the alliance we show how
to find an optimal strategy for the attack and also how such an attack could be resisted and the alliance could
be saved by good management.
2. Modeling interaction under external pressure
In this section we give an example of modelling an interaction in the context of external conditions. As our
example we consider two rival companies engaged in the prisoners’ dilemma game who, at the same time, are
withstanding an attack from a third player. In the model below we choose certain unchangeable factors such
as the value of the market or corporate benefits. Clearly, it is done solely for the purpose of illustrating the
approach and the parameters appropriate to the situation under consideration must be taken by the practitioners
using this framework. For simplicity we also consider a symmetric base interaction which also can be modified
without much difficulty. It is however important to note that the changeable pressure is modelled continuously.
Although in the current situation the specific values of such pressure might apply, it is necessary to estimate
the impact of the pressure over the whole range of possible outcomes.
We begin by modelling an interaction with the prisoners’ dilemma game in which the players simultaneously
choose an action from a set of two actions: “Ally” and “Fight”. Both players choosing “Ally” results in forming
an alliance in which the players share a market (resource) equally and obtain payoff of l. Here 2l represents
the value of the market (resource) share available. One player choosing “Fight” and the other “Ally” will be
taken as the former player is attacking the latter who does not fight back. Here v represents the value of the
market (resource) share transferred as a result of the attack from the “allying” player to the “fighting” player.
The parameter x represents extra costs of running the business outside the alliance compared with the cost of
running the business in alliance (for example, corporate benefits) If both players chose “Fight” then each player
is supposed to have an equal probability of obtaining the whole market (resource). Here f represents the cost
4of fighting. In order for this game to be identified as a prisoners’ dilemma we must have v > x and v > f and
we also assume that x ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0. The payoffs for this game are summarized in the table below.
(1)
P1 \P2 Ally Fight
Ally l \ l
l−v−x \ l+v−x
Fight l+v−x \ l−v−x
l−x−f \ l−x−f
Building on the model let us now assume that there is a third player who attacks the ith player with level qi,
i = 1, 2. For the convenience of the analysis we normalize the levels of the attack to be between zero and one:
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1. If the third player attacks with level qi a market share proportional to the appropriate level of
attack is lost by the ith player. We assume that there may be a cost of being attacked which is proportional to
the level of the attack and will be expressed as qic, where c ≥ 0. We also assume that withstanding an attack
in an alliance may be easier for a company than on its own, so that there maybe an extra cost qiy, y ≥ 0, of an
attack if companies are not in an alliance. Finally, we suppose that if players are in an alliance they share the
cost of the attack equally. These assumptions result in payoffs summarized in the bi-matrix below.
(2)
P1 \P2 Ally Fight
Ally l−lq1−
c
2
(q1+q2) \ l−lq2− c2 (q1+q2)
l+v−x−q1(l−v+c+y) \ l−v−x−q2(l+v+c+y)
Fight l+v−x−q1(l+v+c+y) \ l−v−x−q2(l−v+c+y)
l−x−f−q1(l+c+y) \ l−x−f−q2(l+c+y)
It is fairly simple to obtain the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium conditions, which are summarized in the Table
I below.
(3)
Table I : Nash Equilibrium conditions for two players.
NE P1\P2
Ally\Ally
Fight\Fight
Ally\Fight
Fight\Ally
Condition
q1 ≥
2v−2x+cq2
2v+2y+c
q2 ≥
2v−2x+q1c
2v+2y+c
q1 ≤ 1−
f
v
q2 ≤ 1−
f
v
q1 ≥ 1−
f
v
q2 ≤
2v−2x+q1c
2v+2y+c
q1 ≤
2v−2x+cq2
2v+2y+c
q2 ≥ 1−
f
v
This indicates that the cooperative Nash Equilibrium can be obtained if the levels of attack qi on both players
is quite high. If qi are not high enough the standard non cooperative Nash Equilibrium is observed. If qi vary
significantly the weakly attacked player fights while the strongly attacked player does not fight back. There
could also be a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium as we will show in the example below.
As a next step we consider the rational third player and determine the optimal levels of the attack qi. In this
model we assume that before the game (2) is played the third player chooses qi or, equivalently, that the first
two players are certain about the strength with which they are attacked. This approach simplifies the analysis
of the game. The first and the second player make their choices at the game (2) which determine their own
payoffs and also the payoff obtained by the third player. The payoffs to the third player will be given in Table
II.
(4)
Table II: Payoffs to the third player.
NE P1\P2
Ally\Ally
Fight\Fight
Ally\Fight
Fight\Ally
Payoff (l−σ−ε)(q1+q2) (l−σ−ǫ)(q1+q2) (l−σ)(q1+q2)+v(q2−q1) (l−σ)(q1+q2)+v(q1−q2)
5Here σ represents the cost of the attack, ε represents the additional cost due to attacking an alliance and ǫ
represents the decrement in the cost of the attack if it is made on the companies which are fighting with each
other.
We now consider examples showing how the optimal level of attack can be chosen.
3. Example
Consider the game with the following parameters v = 5, x = 2, y = 2, f = 2 and c = 3. Using formulae (3)
we obtain the following conditions for the various Nash Equilibria.
(5)
Table III : Nash Equilibrium conditions for two players when
v = 5, x = 2, y = 2, f = 2 and c = 3.
NE P1\P2
Ally\Ally
Fight\Fight
Ally\Fight
Fight\Ally
Condition
q1 ≥
3q2+6
17
q2 ≥
3q1+6
17
q1 ≤
3
5
q2 ≤
3
5
q1 ≥
3
5
q2 ≤
3q1+6
17
q1 ≤
3q2+6
17
q2 ≥
3
5
We can also find that if 3q+617 ≤ q1 ≤
3
5 and
3p+6
17 ≤ q2 ≤
3
5 then there is a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium in
which the first player and the second player choose “Ally” with probabilities 6−10q27q2−3q1 and
6−10q1
7q1−3q2
, correspond-
ingly. For each combination of the parameters we have a unique Nash Equilibrium solution except for the region
where 3q+617 ≤ q1 ≤
3
5 and
3p+6
17 ≤ q2 ≤
3
5 for which there are three Nash Equilibria: “Ally”-“Ally”, “Fight”-
“Ally” and the mixed Nash Equilibrium. It can be shown that in this region “Ally”-“Ally” is Pareto efficient
meaning that both players obtain their highest payoffs if the “Ally”-“Ally” is played. The Nash Equilibrium
regions are shown in Figure 1.
Let us now fix parameters determining the payoff of the third player at ε = 1, ǫ = 1, σ = 3 and consider
two scenarios: of high (l = 8) and low (l = 5) value of the market (resource). The payoff to the third player
depends on the strategies of the first two players (4). If the Nash Equilibrium is not unique for some range
of the parameters qi we assume that the Pareto efficient Nash Equilibrium is played. The payoffs to the third
player and the points at which its maxima are reached are summarized in Table IV below.
Table IV: Payoffs to the third player and points of maxima.
l = 8 l = 5
range of q1&q2 NE payoff max at (q1, q2) payoff max at (q1, q2)
3q2+6
17 ≤ q1
3q1+6
17 ≤ q2
AA 4q1 + 4q2 8 (1, 1) q1 + q2 2 (1, 1)
q1 ≤
3
5
q2 ≤
3
5
FF 6q1 + 6q2
108
17
(
3
5 ,
39
85
)
(
39
85 ,
3
5
) 3q1 + 3q2 5417
(
3
5 ,
39
85
)
(
39
85 ,
3
5
)
3
5 ≤ q1
q2 ≤
3q1+6
17
AF 10q2
90
17
(
1, 917
)
7q2 − 3q1
24
17
(
3
5 ,
39
85
)
q1 ≤
3q2+6
17
3
5 ≤ q2
FA 10q1
90
17
(
9
17 , 1
)
7q1 − 3q2
24
17
(
39
85 ,
3
5
)
6We can draw plots (see figure 2 and 3) that represent the payoff obtained by the third player when he chooses
different levels of attack. Comparing the values at the points where the maxima are reached, the optimal choice
of attack levels is q1 = 1 and q2 = 1 if l = 8. Such a strategy of the third player forces the first two players
to form (or maintain) an alliance. If l = 5, we see that the third player obtains maximum payoff at the points
(
3
5 ,
39
85
)
or
(
39
85 ,
3
5
)
but if the levels of attack are set to be exactly at these values the payoff bi-matrix (2) for
the two firms is non-generic and there exist an infinite number of Nash Equilibria for this game. It includes the
“Ally”-“Ally” Nash Equilibrium which, if it is played by the first two players, gives them the highest payoffs.
The third player obtains the payoff of 5417 only if the first two players choose to fight. Therefore to prevent the
first and the second players from swapping between Nash Equilibria the third player must not choose
(
3
5 ,
39
85
)
or
(
39
85 ,
3
5
)
but choose
(
3
5 − δ1,
39
85 − δ2
)
or
(
39
85 − δ1,
3
5 − δ2
)
such that these points are still in (“Fight”-“Fight”)
Nash Equilibrium region and δ1 and δ2 are very small. We can see that for this example the optimal choice of
parameters q1 and q2 does not exist. The best strategy for the third player would be to break the alliance by
using appropriate levels of attack. In this case a moderate, asymmetric attack will achieve higher payoff than
a strong (symmetric or asymmetric) attack.
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Figure 1:
NE regions for player 1 and 2.
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Figure 2:
3 player’s payoffs l=8.
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Figure 3:
3 player’s payoffs l=5.
It is possible to show that (for v = 5, x = 2, y = 2, f = 2, c = 3, ε = 1, ǫ = 1) if the difference between value
of the market l and the price of the attack δ is
• less than −1 (note that in this case the actual cost of the attack is σ− ǫ so the difference between value
of the market l and the cost of the attack is less than 0) then it is optimal not to attack, that is q1 = 0
and q2 = 0;
• between −1 and 134 then the optimal choice of parameters q1 and q2 does not exist and the third player
should follow the approach described above;
• greater than 134 then the optimal choice of attack levels is q1 = 1 and q2 = 1; this choice of the third
player forces the first and the second players to form (or maintain) an alliance.
The proof can be obtained using item-by-item examination of all possible cases. Similar conditions can be
obtained for any generic set of parameters.
74. Summary and discussions.
This simple example leads to a few important conclusions.
Firstly, as it can be seen from the results summarized in figure 1, the successful formation of an alliance
greatly depends on the position of the players on the Nash Equilibrium diagram (figure 1). As in a single
interaction prisoners’ dilemma in the absence of pressure cooperative behaviour is not a Nash Equilibrium and
alliances which are formed under such conditions are not stable. However under the threat of an attack by
another player (or under unfavorable conditions) the players may be induced to cooperate. It is clear that
cooperative behaviour becomes a Nash Equilibrium of the game (2) because an attack on the players changes
their payoffs. But on the other hand, if, in modelling, such changes are not taken into account we would obtain
the result that cooperation is not rational when, in fact, it is. In the considered model strong pressure, where
its level does not vary significantly between the players will stabilize the possibility of forming an alliance. On
the other hand, an asymmetric, weak or moderate pressure does not provide an incentive for cooperation.
In this instance the possibility for stabilizing an alliance arises by applying a careful managing strategy. For
example, assume the first player position and suppose that q1 = 1/5 (other values of q1 can be treated in a
similar way). Assume also that the first player is interested in forming an alliance. The idea is that the first
player may be able to change its own value of q1 (for example by engaging in unilateral commitments up to
some extent) in such a way that the alliance becomes a Nash Equilibrium. Three different approaches must be
taken in such a situation depending on the value on q2. If 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 3/7 (3/7 appears as the point of intersection
of q1 = (3q2 + 6) /17 and q2 = (3q1 + 6) /17) both players are in the “Fight”-“Fight” region and the pressure
on the second player is not high enough to promote a stable alliance. In this case the first player’s best strategy
would be “Fight”. The unilateral commitments would only shift the players position into “Ally”-“Fight” region
and the first company would suffer losses. If 3/7 < q2 ≤ 3/5 both players are still in the “Fight”-“Fight” region
but the pressure on the second player is high enough to allow for the possibility of an alliance. As can be seen
from the figure 1, the first company may change its own value of q1 in such a way that “Ally”-“Ally” becomes a
Nash Equilibrium. The unilateral commitments in this case can lead to ensuring an alliance, though it should
be noted that the level of such commitments must be carefully assessed in order to avoid shifting the players
even further to the right on the Nash Equilibrium diagram which would result in “Ally”-“Fight” equilibrium
and alliance failure. If 3/5 ≤ q2 the second player is under high pressure and is likely to cooperate. The main
threat to the alliance is that the first player might prefer to use such an opportunity to maximize its immediate
payoff jeopardizing the future of the alliance. To avoid such a contempt (for example the first company might
be interested in a strategic alliance which is expected to be highly beneficial in the future) the first player might
engage in unilateral commitments to stabilize the alliance. As we can see engaging in unilateral commitments
might be highly beneficial for formation and maintaining of an alliance if used appropriately. Note that it is
assumed that the parameters of the model can be estimated accurately enough. Although it is always possible
to allow for a margin of error, such an error must not be neglected when a strategy is chosen as it might
significantly change the strategy. The analysis of the risks arising from this situation must be done, however
we do not address this issue in this paper.
8The alliances must be frequently reassessed and managed1. In this instance the results of the model can also
be used for projections of possible outcomes of an alliance. The estimates of future threats and pressures must
be made. If a company anticipates the position of an alliance to leave the “Ally”-“Ally” region it should be
assessed if it is possible to save the alliance by changing the values of q1 or (and) q2. If it is possible, careful
management might save the alliance. If it is not the case the company might save itself from heavy losses in
the future by withdrawing from an alliance prior to its failure.
Another result of the above analysis concerns the third player’s strategy. As we have seen from the examples,
depending on the relationship between the value of the market and the costs of the attack, the third player may
either wish to split the alliance or it may be better for the third player to engage in the strongest symmetric
attack. A strong attack, where the level of attack does not vary significantly between the target firms, will
stabilize an alliance. An asymmetric, weak or moderate attack will result in an alliance failure if the alliance is
not managed well. It must be noticed though that in this situation there exist mechanisms implying that good
management can always ensure that the alliance withstands an attack. The strategy here is the same as when
3/5 ≤ q2 : the weakly attacked player (let us say player one) must increase the value of q1 to shift the players
position to the right on the Nash Equilibrium diagram. This opportunity might be important then the third
player represents hostile conditions for one of the partners which are of a temporary nature. In this situation
the temporary sacrifice of another player might save the alliance from failure bringing strategic benefits in the
future.
As it can be seen from the example we have considered, a simple idea of including environmental conditions
into consideration provides several important implications which would be overseen otherwise. In the considered
example, in addition to explaining the mechanisms which might be responsible for formation of alliances, one of
the important benefits is to allow us to distinguish between two “Fight”-“Fight” situations. In one unilateral
commitments are beneficial and in another would imply losses. These allow us to use the proposed approach
for determining successful strategies for forming and maintaining alliances.
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